The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has known for decades that the nuclear industry is in violation of federal fire code for the protection of electrical cables vital to the shutdown of nuclear power plants. It was first demonstrated with the Browns Ferry fire in March 1975 that control room electrical circuits to shut down and cool the reactor cores are vulnerable and again in 1992 as the result of the discovery of industrywide installations of bogus fire barriers that failed fire tests in less than half the required times legally certified as required for public safety.
In spite of the efforts of public interest groups, like Beyond Nuclear, the NRC and the nuclear industry continue to ignore long standing violations of fire code and are looking to shift away from compliance with "prescriptive fire code" for inspectable physical fire protection features like fire proof barriers and penetration seals or minimum separation distances between redundant backup electrical cables. The NRC and industry instead plan to base safety compliance upon "risk informing" fire protection with assumptions on how serious a fire might be; not unlike basing nuclear safety on assumptions about earthquake magnitudes or the height of tsunamis.
Beyond Nuclear's persistent efforts to expose the fire hazard in nuclear power plants are cited in two provocative revelations by Susan Stranahan and John Sullivan in yet another finding of the NRC standing for "No Regulatory Control."